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Abstract
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) recently launched the Explainable Artifi-
cial Intelligence (XAI) program that aims to create
a suite of new AI techniques that enable end users
to understand, appropriately trust, and effectively
manage the emerging generation of AI systems.
In this paper, inspired by DARPA’s XAI program,
we propose a new paradigm in security research:
Explainable Security (XSec). We discuss the “Six
Ws” of XSec (Who? What? Where? When? Why?
and How?) and argue that XSec has unique and
complex characteristics: XSec involves several dif-
ferent stakeholders (i.e., the system’s developers,
analysts, users and attackers) and is multi-faceted
by nature (as it requires reasoning about system
model, threat model and properties of security, pri-
vacy and trust as well as about concrete attacks,
vulnerabilities and countermeasures). We define a
roadmap for XSec that identifies several possible
research directions.
1 Introduction
The security of information, data, processes, software, proto-
cols, computers, networks and systems is notoriously a chal-
lenging problem (and very often an undecidable one). Secu-
rity is difficult. It is difficult to achieve, to reason about, to
apply, to understand, to teach. It is difficult to explain.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) recently launched the
Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
program that aims to create a suite of new AI techniques that
enable end users to understand, appropriately trust, and effec-
tively manage the emerging generation of AI systems. Some
research on explainable AI had already been published before
DARPA’s program (e.g., [Swartout et al., 1991; Ye and John-
son, 1995; Aldeco-Pe´rez and Moreau, 2008; Aldeco-Pe´rez
and Moreau, 2010; Bidot et al., 2010; Sohrabi et al., 2011;
Seegebarth et al., 2012; Papadimitriou et al., 2012; Gedikli et
al., 2014]), but XAI encouraged a large number of researchers
to take up this challenge. In the last couple of years, several
publications have appeared that investigate how to explain the
different areas of AI, such as machine learning [Hendricks et
al., 2016], recommender systems [Muhammad et al., 2016],
robotics and autonomous systems [Rosenthal et al., 2016;
Sheh, 2017; Hayes and Shah, 2017], constraint reason-
ing [Freuder, 2017] and planning [Chakraborti et al., 2017;
Fox et al., 2017; Langley et al., 2017].1
In this paper, inspired by the XAI program, we propose a
new paradigm in security research:
Explainable Security (XSec).
Some pioneering works on explaining security have focused
on security for relational databases [Bender et al., 2014]
and on explanation and trust [Pieters, 2011]. In [Bender et
al., 2014], Bender, Kot and Gehrke propose a new model in
which policy decisions are explainable. In this model, instead
of simply rejecting an unauthorized query by a principal, the
system provides the principal with a concise explanation of
why the query was rejected and what additional permissions
the principal would need to be granted for a successful ex-
ecution. The principal can then refine the query or request
additional permissions based on the explanation provided.
In [Pieters, 2011], Pieters investigates the relation between
explanation and trust, focusing in particular on expert systems
and e-voting systems. Pieters observes that
In artificial intelligence, explanations are usually
provided by the system itself. In information se-
curity, explanations are provided by the designers.
Nonetheless, in both artificial intelligence and in-
formation security, the role of explanations consists
for a major part of acquiring and maintaining the
trust of the user of the system.
He discusses how explanations are required for trust:
Here, the question is how it is possible to com-
municate the analysis that experts have made of a
security-sensitive system to the public. Why is it
secure? Or, more appropriately: How is it secure?
Explanations are thus
thought to bridge the gap between ‘actual security’
and ‘perceived security’.
1See also [Miller, 2017] and the other papers listed at
http://home.earthlink.net/˜dwaha/research/
meetings/faim18-xai/.
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Pieters also discusses two main goals that an explanation
may have: transparency (e.g., to allow users to understand
what the designers have done to protect them) and jus-
tification (e.g., offering reasons for an action). He con-
trasts explanation-for-trust (i.e., explanation of how a system
works, by revealing details of its internal operations) with
explanation-for-confidence (i.e., explanation to make the user
feel comfortable in using the system, by providing informa-
tion on its external communications).
We argue that XSec is a difficult problem and that it has
unique and complex characteristics. In fact, XSec is more
complex than what is discussed by Bender et al. and by
Pieters; it is also more complex than usable security [Payne
and Edwards, 2008; Wash and Zurko, 2017], security aware-
ness [Banfield, 2016; Yildirim, 2016] and security eco-
nomics [Anderson, 2018]. This is because XSec involves
several different stakeholders (i.e., the system’s developers,
analysts, users and attackers) and is multi-faceted by nature
(as it requires reasoning about system model, threat model
and properties of security, privacy and trust as well as about
concrete attacks, vulnerabilities and countermeasures). XSec
is thus an exciting novel paradigm that requires a full-fledged
and heterogeneous research program to be realized. In the
following, we define a roadmap that identifies several possi-
ble research directions. To describe the challenges of XSec
and how they could be tackled, we proceed by discussing the
“Six Ws” of XSec summarized in Figure 1: Who? What?
Where? When? Why? and How?
2 Who?
Consider a generic system, where we use here “system” to
refer to a generic process, software, protocol, computer, net-
work, cyber-physical system, critical infrastructure, etc. that
processes information/data whose security must be protected,
where “security” similarly generically refers to one or more
of the security properties of interest, including confidential-
ity, integrity, availability, authentication, authorization, non-
repudiation, accountability, unobservability, privacy, etc.
The dramatis personae of XSec are:
• the designer (and/or developer) of the system, who has
designed (and/or developed) the system to guarantee a
number of specified security properties;
• the user (and/or client) of the system, who can typically
be assumed to be an honest non-expert who might com-
mit mistakes that make the system vulnerable;
• the attacker (or more attackers) of the system, who
searches for and exploits vulnerabilities of the system
for reasons or profit, fame, reward, etc.;
• the analyst of the system, who carries out a semi-formal
or formal analysis of the system at design time (or
based on the specification of a deployed system) or tests
the system at runtime (e.g., using penetration testing,
vulnerability-based testing or model-based testing);
• the defender of the system, who attempts to protect the
system, e.g., by monitoring the activities of the system
and reacting to the attacker’s actions.
For some situations, the recipient of the explanation will
be an agent rather than a human, and we can then contrast
internal explanations (designed for software agents) and ex-
ternal explanations (designed for humans, which is what XAI
research typically focuses on).
Some of the above roles might actually be played by the
same “principal” (agent or human), as the designer might for
instance act also as analyst or defender, the analyst might also
provide immediate defense and the attacker might be a user
of the system. The literature is full of examples of vulnera-
bilities caused by mistakes by designers or users, along with
details of the corresponding attacks. Some of these attacks
could have been prevented by better explanations. In fact,
all of these roles might require explanations or need
to act as explainer,
For instance,
• a designer and/or an analyst might need to explain to the
user how to interact with the system, why the system is
secure and why it carries out a particular action (in line
with what is discussed in [Bender et al., 2014; Pieters,
2011]);
• a user or client might need to explain to the designer or
the analyst how he expects the system to behave and how
they typically interact with the system, to allow the de-
signer to elicit the requirements for building the system
in the first place and to allow the analyst to validate the
security of user interactions;
• an attacker might need to explain the attack strategy to
his accomplices so that they can attack in coordination,
or he might have used a complex penetration testing tool
to test the system for vulnerabilities and now needs the
tool to explain to him the attack trace (or attack plan or
strategy) that has been identified so that he can carry out
the attack for real;
• an analyst might need to explain to the designer how to
improve the system’s security or to the defender how and
what to defend;
• a defender might similarly need to understand possible
attack traces in order to take action against them as well
as explain to the users how they should behave to protect
the system and themselves.
In addition to this, it is also necessary to tackle the research
question of what actually constitutes a good (and secure) ex-
planation, as we discuss in more detail in the following sec-
tions.
Before we do so, let us consider a concrete example that
arises from the observation that when dealing with sensitive
data, classical authentication solutions based on username-
password pairs are not enough. The “General Data Protection
Regulation” [European Commission, 2016] mandates that
specific security measures must be implemented, including
multi-factor authentication (MFA), an authentication solution
that aims to augment the security of the basic username-
password authentication by exploiting two or more authen-
tication factors (see, e.g., [Sciarretta et al., 2018]). In [Euro-
pean Central Bank, 2014], MFA is for instance defined as:
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Figure 1: The Six Ws of Explainable Security
“a procedure based on the use of two or more of the fol-
lowing elements — categorised as knowledge, ownership
and inherence: i) something only the user knows, e.g.,
static password, code, personal identification number;
ii) something only the user possesses, e.g., token, smart
card, mobile phone; iii) something the user is, e.g. a bio-
metric characteristic, such as a fingerprint. In addition,
the elements selected must be mutually independent [...]
at least one of the elements should be non-reusable and
non-replicable”.
The underlying idea is that the more factors are used during
the authentication process, the more confidence a service has
that the user is correctly identified. This is the basic expla-
nation provided by the designer to the user to justify a more
involved authentication that the user might perceive as cum-
bersome. However, the user might also need to be told that
choosing a weak password is a bad idea even in the case of
MFA. Two attacker accomplices who carry out a coordinated
attack against the two components of MFA might need to ex-
plain their sub-attack to each other to ensure their ultimate
success. The analyst who has discovered an attack to the
MFA system might need to explain to the designer why the
attack succeeeded and how to patch it. The analyst/defender
might also need to explain to the users why they should, e.g.,
abandon the use of one of the elements they had been using so
far and switch to using another pair of elements; for instance,
because the new password that a user has chosen is too weak
and thus easily guessable, or because the device on which
the user is trying to authenticate does not include a biometric
reader.
There are thus many things to explain by/to many dif-
ferent stakeholders, which is one of the main reasons why
XSec, even in the case of a relatively simple example such as
MFA, is a challenging endeavor. In the following, we discuss
the five remaining Ws, although we have already anticipated
much of the discussion here (which is somewhat unavoidable
given that the Ws are not independent but quite deeply inter-
twined).
3 What?
It is not enough to explain the system in a generic way. First
of all, the different stakeholders will need explanations at dif-
ferent levels of detail and with different aims:
• designers/developers will need an explanation of the
desiderata of the client that is detailed enough for them
to be able to realize the system in a satisfactory and se-
cure way (e.g., if the client wants a system that replaces
passwords with face recognition);
• non-expert users will need an explanation that increases
their confidence and trust, and that also teaches them
how to use the system correctly and securely (e.g., if
passcodes are used as back-up in case face recognition
fails as in the iPhone X, then the user should be made
aware that the passcode ought to be strong enough and
not guessable such as a date of birth or a phone num-
ber, since otherwise an attacker who steals the iPhone
X will obviously fail face recognition but the iPhone X
will allow him to get access by guessing the passcode);
• analysts will need access to the system’s specification
or to the system’s code in order to be able to create a
model to analyze or to be able to generate and execute
test cases;
• designers/developers/defenders will need an explanation
of a vulnerability and related attacks in order to imple-
ment patches or defenses;
• attackers will need an explanation of how to exploit pos-
sible vulnerabilities, of why their attacks failed and of
the implications of new security techniques on their at-
tack strategies.
Second, several different “things” will need to be ex-
plained, including:
• the system and the system model used for design, im-
plementation and analysis, e.g., the model of how MFA
actually works;
• the security properties that the system should guarantee.
e.g., the authentication provided by MFA can be used as
a basis to provide authorization, integrity, confidential-
ity, non-repudiation and so on;
• the threat model that has been considered by designers,
developers and analysts, highlighting, in particular, the
fact that a system might be secure against one threat
model but insecure against another (e.g., a system might
be secure against an outside attacker but insecure against
insider attacks) or the fact that the successful MFA of a
user won’t prevent the system from being attacked when
that user turns out to be malignant and reveals, say, trade
secrets of the company he works for;
• the actual vulnerability and related attack that has been
discovered will need to be explained to the attacker (es-
pecially when the attacker used a tool to search for an
attack and now needs to carry out it concretely), along
with the costs and benefits of the attack;
• the possible countermeasures for the discovered vul-
nerability and related attack will need to be explained
(along with the vulnerability and the attack) to the hon-
est stakeholders who will need to understand the attack’s
impact, its risk and the mitigation strategies.
To that end, it will be helpful to answer a number of questions,
including:
• What is actually secure? Which parts of the system?
Which security properties are guaranteed and for how
long? (For instance, authentication is typically granted
for a session, which expires after some amount of time.)
Which features are insecure and why and how can they
be attacked? Are there different levels of security (e.g.,
for users with different rights)?
• What is the threat model considered? Does it include
insiders and outsiders? Who are the potential attackers
and what do they want? Why do they want it?
• How does the attack look like and how “difficult” is it?
How expensive is it? (It does not make sense to use a
one million dollar machine to mount an attack with a
loot of a few thousand dollars.) How long will the attack
take? (If students try to steal the questions of their next
exam but their attack takes so long that they get hold of
the questions only after the exam has been given by the
professors, then there is actually no point.) This requires
reasoning quantitatively about the economics of the at-
tack (including costs, performance, time) but also about
the trade-off between attacking and the risk of being dis-
covered.
• Under which assumptions and conditions is the system
assumed to be operating securely or has been proved
to be secure? For instance, many security analyses
(e.g., of protocols or web applications) typically as-
sume a Dolev-Yao-style attacker [Dolev and Yao, 1983]
who controls the network but cannot break cryptogra-
phy, which is quite a strong assumption to make as cryp-
tography might indeed be broken (by classical comput-
ers and even more so by quantum computers if and when
they will be realized in their full capacity); on the other
hand, relaxing this assumption and considering an at-
tacker who might be able to break cryptography typi-
cally complicates the analysis (the problem is undecid-
able anyway) and the ability of an analyst to prove secu-
rity guarantees.
• What are the legal implications of the explanation? Is
the explanation “binding”? This would require, for in-
stance, explaining how the system works and what is ex-
pected of the user, possibly including a digital signature
to acknowledge the receipt and understanding of the ex-
planation. In case of an attack, this would also require
explaining what happened and why, and what counter-
measures can be taken (and by whom).
4 Where?
We have already addressed the question of which “parts” of
the system need to be explained in the “What?” section. Now
we focus briefly on the question of where the explanations
should be made available. A number of different options are
available here, including the following four main ones:
• One could include the explanations to the users as part
of the security/privacy policy, but it is well known that
users typically ignore the policy and scroll down as
quickly as possible so that they can get on with their
interaction with the system.
• One could completely detach the explanation from the
system, e.g., by making it available on a different web-
page, but it is unclear to us if and how the relevant stake-
holders will be made aware of where to find the expla-
nation and whether they will decide to trust it.
• One could consider a sort of explainable security as a
service, where stakeholders interact with an expert sys-
tem to obtain and/or provide explanations.
• One could proceed in the style of proof-carrying
code [Necula, 1997], “appending” a possibly digitally-
signed explanation to the system to achieve a security-
explanation-carrying-system. We believe that this is the
most promising direction, but it will of course require
considerable work to protect the explanation from at-
tacks and actually explain to the stakeholder how they
can access it and make use of it.
5 When?
We want Explainable Security and we want it now! Jokes
aside, the many vulnerabilities that are reported daily, includ-
ing some of our most widespread and supposedly secure sys-
tems (consider, e.g., recent attacks against: TLS; PGP; pro-
cessors; dropbox, one drive, iCloud and other cloud systems;
biometric authentication systems; e-commerce and e-banking
systems; e-voting systems, etc.), are witness to the fact that
security is indeed difficult to achieve (which is why security
has been and still is one of the hottest research topics) but also
that in many cases security systems are difficult to explain to
the different stakeholders.
We need to explain security when the system is
• designed,
• implemented,
• deployed and installed,
• used,
• analyzed,
• attacked,
• defended,
• modified,
and possibly even when the system is decommissioned and
replaced, so that the different stakeholders understand why
this decision was taken and how the new system will improve
over the old one.
In particular, explanations will need to be defined and pro-
vided at design time (when the system is developed) but also
at runtime (when the system is running). For the runtime case,
think, e.g., of a critical system, critical infrastructure or cyber-
physical system such as a nuclear power plant in which a su-
pervisor is in charge of setting high/low security levels and of
intervening in the case of an ongoing attack to estimate the
success chances of the attack, understand its impact on the
system and adopt possible countermeasures (see, e.g., [Lan-
otte et al., 2017]). The attack could have disastrous conse-
quences (e.g., manipulating the SCADA and PLC systems of
a power plant as the Stuxnet Worm [Falliere et al., 2011]) or
(appear to) be non-threatening as it manipulates sensors and
actuators of the system but without bringing them outside of
their tolerance zone so that the supervisor actually decides not
to intervene.
6 Why?
This is easiest question to answer: because all the different
stakeholders of a system want it to be secure (well, with the
exception of the attacker, of course). Explanations will help
increase confidence, trust, transparency, usability and con-
crete usage (in the sense that users will be more keen to adopt
the system), accountability, verifiability and testability.
7 How?
As we already remarked above, the different stakeholders will
need explanations at different levels of detail and with dif-
ferent aims, and these explanations will need to be compre-
hensible, timely and accurate (among other properties). The
explanations will need to be written in a language (and with
a description strategy) suitable for the intended audience, in-
cluding
• natural language (used to produce informal but possibly
structured text written in English or any other language
understandable by the audience);
• graphical languages such as explanation trees, attack
trees, attack-defense trees, attack graphs, attack patterns,
message-sequence charts, use case diagrams ...;
• formal languages including proofs and plans;
• games that have been produced as the result of a gamifi-
cation process to teach users how to interact with a sys-
tem (although one could actually object that such games
often provide for some “unconscious learning” in which
the user learns how to interact but without really under-
standing why).
It should also be investigated whether one learns more by see-
ing a proof of the security of the system or by being shown
an attack against an insecure system. Both are of course
useful, but they explain different things in a different way,
and they can both be traced back to the question asked by
Pieters [2011] of “how it is possible to communicate the anal-
ysis that experts have made of a security-sensitive system to
the public”.
It will also be necessary to evaluate security explanations
originating from applications of XAI and other areas of com-
puter science, and possibly even social sciences, psychology
and other disciplines. Careful subject studies will need to
be designed to assess measurement categories such as: a pri-
ori measures of explanation quality, user satisfaction, mental
model understanding, and user-machine task performance.
Moreover, the explanation processes will themselves have
to be designed properly, tested thoroughly and deployed cor-
rectly, and it will be useful to investigate the trade-off be-
tween such explanation processes and the security threats.
We expect that many of the How? questions posed in the
specific case of security will actually be answerable by suit-
ably adapting and extending the techniques and tools that
have been and are being developed for XAI. Still, we con-
clude the discussion of the Ws by considering again the
claim that we made above that XSec has unique and com-
plex characteristics, and is more challenging than the pioneer-
ing research on explanations in security [Bender et al., 2014;
Pieters, 2011]. Let us illustrate this by an example that shows
that XSec calls for proper extensions of the research on XAI
and for novel investigations.
In Explainable Planning [Fox et al., 2017], one of the ques-
tions the planner should answer is why things cannot be done
and why and how one needs to replan. Similarly, in the model
of Bender et al., the relational database system provides the
principal with a concise explanation of why the query was
rejected and what additional permissions the principal would
need to be granted for a successful execution. If one considers
a more general security system, however, such an explanation
might make the system less secure! This is because the ex-
planation itself might reveal security-sensitive information.
For instance, the attacker might not know whether a certain
person is indeed a user of the system: trying to login pretend-
ing to be that user and being told that the user does not exist,
or that the password is wrong, or that the user needs more
privileges to be able to carry out some specific action already
constitutes a leak of information.2 Hence, explanations need
to be “relativized” and in some cases made less “powerful” by
withholding certain details. But a less powerful explanation is
essentially an incomplete explanation, which will be ignored
or not fully achieve its purpose. The quest for a reasonable
trade-off thus makes XSec particularly challenging.
8 Conclusions
We see XSec as a new paradigm that brings together many
hot topics and current trends but also indicates the need of
exploring unchartered territory. This paper has just skimmed
the surface of XSec by pointing out some of the main objec-
tives and challenges, and defining a roadmap that identifies
several possible research directions.
We have already begun a more detailed investigation of the
different techniques and tools that can be exploited or need to
be developed to answer the questions posed by the different
Ws, as well as formalizing the relationships and interdepen-
dences between the Ws. More specifically, we expect that,
using the growing amount of results on XAI together with the
pioneering research on explanations in security and trust as a
stepping stone, we will soon be able to provide some concrete
answers. To that end, we will also take inspiration from re-
search that have attempted to “bridge the gap” between differ-
ent research questions and different communities, such as the
work of Hoffman on planning for penetration testing [2015].
This is the beginning of a beautiful friendship between ex-
planations and security, and we plan to be part of the fellow-
ship that nurtures this friendship.
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